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1. Introduction
A well-functioning labour market is a critical aspect in the pro-poor agenda at both the 
macro and microeconomic levels. In many developing economies, labour markets do not 
function well due to barriers or other inefficiencies that arise from specific characteristics 
of the economy in question, or because of government interventions. The existence of 
distortions usually discriminate against the interests of poor households while also impair 
economic development. The challenge for policy makers is to ensure that labour markets 
function properly and operate as a link with other markets and in a pro-poor fashion. In 
Brazil, the functioning of labour markets has been the subject of intense debate among 
analysts and policymakers for decades. The main issue of divergence regards its degree 
of flexibility, as there are two clear and distinct views about how labour demand and 
supply behave in Brazil. In the first view, Brazilian labour markets are characterized both 
as flexible and efficient. In the second, as segmented and inequitable, and almost 
everything in between. Evidence in favour of the first view is usually attributed to a 
relatively low rate of unemployment, the general pragmatic labour unions, a low 
minimum wage and a high rate of job turnover. Supporters of the second view claim that 
the jobs markets do not work well and point to the high rate of informality, the frequency 
of litigation in labour courts, high inequality of earnings, and the limited reach of labour 
laws and government interventions to assist workers who need help [Carneiro et al. 
(2002)].
There is also a huge debate on how poverty and inequality can be reduced in Brazil by 
means of changes in labour legislation, the creation of a more flexible labour market, an 
increase in labour productivity, and introduction of a more stable economic environment 
for business creation. Understanding how the Brazilian labour market works is of 
fundamental importance to think of alternative strategies for poverty reduction. This 
report addresses the debate on how the Brazilian labour market functions and its relations 
with poverty levels in the country. But in order to examine its main features, it is 
necessary to keep some simple statistics and definitions in mind. In 2000, the Brazilian 
labour force was of about 80 million, what (considering that two-thirds of its population 
of 170 million is of working age) implies a labour force participation rate of about 70 
percent. As the unemployment rate averages 8 percent, this means that employment is 
about 73 million. Out of this total, some 3 million are employers, and self-employed 
workers number roughly 73 million. The remaining 53 million is split evenly between 
formal and informal wage and salaried workers.
In terms of labour market institutions that affect labour market functioning in Brazil, 
none is more influential than its system of labour courts, known as the justiça trabalhista, 
a special section of the judicial branch of government that employs judges, lawyers and 
others charged with resolving labour disputes between employers and workers. As argued 
by Camargo (2002), by all measures, these people are extraordinarily busy. In 2000, for 
example, Brazil’s labour courts entertained about 2 million complaints, an order of 
magnitude larger than in the US (17,000) and Japan (1,500), which have larger labour 
forces. Higher labour turnover such as those observed in Brazil signal to lower labour 
productivity and consequently lower labour remuneration, with unstable and weak labour
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relations. Weak labour relations are conducive to informality, which is highly associated 
with poverty and deteriorating working and living conditions.
The report is structured in 13 sections. The analysis starts with a brief description of the 
profile of the poor in Brazil (Section 2). In Section 3, the report presents an overview of 
the ILO’s work on employment creation in Brazil and Latin America, in line with the 
international debate on core labour standards and freedom of association. In section 4, we 
discuss how labour is organized in Brazil, the main features of the current set of labour 
laws in both the urban and the rural sector. Sections 5 and 6 assess how labour courts 
affect labour relations and the functioning of labour markets. Section 7 reviews evidence 
on the structure and evolution of informal employment, while Section 8 investigates 
labour market adjustment under different economic contexts. The social safety net 
available in Brazil is assessed in Sections 9 and 10 that also present an analysis of key 
labour market indicators and an evaluation of active labour market policy targeting. 
Section 11 addresses the importance of gender and race in affecting labour relations and 
Section 12 discusses the impact of globalization on poverty and inequality in Brazil. 
Section 13 concludes.
2. A P rofile  o f  P overty  in  B razil
In a recent study, the World Bank has presented a comprehensive profile of the urban and 
rural poor in Brazil based on household data and a methodology of analysis developed by 
a research group at IPEA led by Ricardo Paes de Barros [see W orld Bank (2000)]. Thus, 
in this section, we present the most important characteristics of poverty in Brazil, drawing 
on the evidence collected by the W orld Bank.
A poor person is defined as living in a household with per capita income less than the 
equivalent of R$65 per month at São Paulo Metropolitan Area prices. The poverty line of 
R$65 is determined by the cost of a basic food basket (extreme poverty line). At the 
chosen extreme poverty line, Brazil has a poverty headcount ratio (poverty rate) of 
22.6%. This means 34.9 million Brazilians live in households with a per-capita income 
below the poverty line. A little more than half of the poor (52.5%) live in urban areas. 
Of the urban poor, 39% live in urban areas with a population less than 20,000; 23% live 
in urban areas with a population between 20,000 and 100,000; 16% live in urban areas 
with more than 100,000 inhabitants; and finally 21% live in the metropolitan areas. In 
terms of geographical distribution, 63% of the poor live in the Northeast, 18% in the 
Southeast, 8% in the South, 6% in the North and 5% in the Centerwest. Table 1 shows the 
distribution of Brazil’s poor between regions and areas.
Table 1: Distribution o f Poor by Region and Area____________________________________________________
Share of total poverty______________Northeast_______ Centerwest North_________ Southeast South_________ Total
Metropolitan Core 3.6% 0.2% 0.4% 1.3% 0.3% 5.8%
Metropolitan Periphery 2.4% 0.0% 0.1% 2.4% 0.5% 5.4%
Large Urban 4.8% 0.7% 1.1% 1.3% 0.6% 8.5%
Medium Urban 6.6% 0.7% 1.7% 1.9% 1.3% 12.2%
Small Urban 12.5% 1.2% 2.4% 3.1% 1.2% 20.5%
Rural 32.7% 2.1% 0.7% 7.7% 4.3% 47.5%
Total 62.7% 5.0% 6.4% 17.7% 8.1% 100.0%
“Poor Areas” (per capita earnings less than R$160 per month) shaded in gray.
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Overall, there is a strong concentration of the poor in the Northeast and in the rural and 
the small and medium sized urban areas, both in terms of absolute numbers and in terms 
of poverty rates. Both in absolute terms (number of poor) as well as in relative terms 
(poverty rate), poverty is the worst in rural areas; within urban areas, poverty is more 
severe in small and medium sized urban areas; and poverty is least severe in the 
metropolitan core areas. From 1993 to 1998, poverty declined less in the Northeast, in 
the rural areas, and in the small and medium sized urban areas. Consequently, poverty 
became more concentrated in these areas. This profile presents a stark contrast to the 
common perception of poverty in the favelas  of the mega-cities of São Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro, where poverty is most visible. In fact, the poor of the metropolitan areas (core 
and periphery) of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte together constitute only 
3.7% of Brazil's poor or 7% of Brazil's urban poor. This finding suggests a stronger 
policy focus on the poor in small and medium sized cities.
While not as severe in income terms, large-city poverty may be significantly worse due to 
other forms of deprivation linked to crowding. There are indications that welfare 
outcomes (determined, for example, by infant mortality) in the bigger cities might be 
worse than income measures of poverty indicate. Controlling for poverty rates, 
education, and access to safe water, infant mortality rises significantly with city size, 
most likely related to crowding and pollution at the local level. Also, crime and violence 
are more severe in the larger cities. In larger cities, crime and violence are sometimes 
identified as the most significant barrier obstructing the escape from poverty. These 
observations suggest that an increased focus on income poverty in smaller and medium­
sized cities should not divert attention away from the persisting poverty problems of the 
larger cities, where a focus in particular on the non-income dimensions of poverty would 
be justified.
Income poverty is closely associated with other forms of deprivation. The poor have less 
access to public services, such as water, sanitation, and garbage collection. Even though 
country-wide electrification rates are high, a quarter of the poor still live without access 
to electricity. 52% of the poor have no canalised water, 68% have no garbage collection, 
and 78% have neither sewage connection nor septic tanks. Interestingly, residence in a 
favela  is not significantly related to income poverty. Health indicators, such as infant 
mortality, are significantly higher for the poor. Finally, crime and violence in urban areas 
typically affect the poorest most severely.
Most poor do not work in the formal labour market. A large share of the poor work in the 
informal sector (22% are informal employees and 37% are self-employed) or are inactive 
(15%). Only 15% of the poor are working in the formal sector (private or public); only 
5% are unemployed. This means that social policies tied to formal employment or 
unemployment have only very limited reach among the poor.
The three factors most closely associated with poverty as likely underlying causes are 
location in a poor area, low schooling, and large household size. Location (region and 
area) is the strongest explanatory variable (in a statistical sense) for poverty. Even 
households with the same characteristics are more likely to be poor in poorer than in
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richer areas. A poverty rate of nearly 50% in the Northeast suggests a more explicit 
approach toward regional equality and regional targeting in social policies and funding 
allocations.
Poverty is closely associated with low levels of education: 73% of poor households are 
headed by individuals with four or less years of schooling. Educational inequality, rather 
than labour market segmentation or discrimination, explains most labour income 
inequality in Brazil. Low education levels lead to low incomes, which in turn, lead to 
low school attendance of children, perpetuating poverty.
Household size is strongly correlated with poverty. Poverty rates increase with the 
dependency ratio (share of income earners over non-income earners in the household). 
As observed all over the world, increased income and improved health indicators would 
typically reduce dependency ratios and thus further increase perspectives for poverty 
reduction.
Child labour is also usually associated with poverty in Brazil, as families in which 
children go to work tend to have household income close to the poverty line. Data from 
the 1999 national household survey (PNAD) collected by Kassouf (2001) show that 1% 
of the children between the ages of 5 and 9 and 9% between the ages of 10 and 14 work 
more than the legal ceiling of 44 hours a week in Brazil. Similarly, some 18% of the 
children between the ages of 5 and 9 and 41% of those aged between 10 and 14 work 
more than 20 hours a week. Boys usually work longer hours than girls in the rural sector, 
with the opposite taking place in the urban sector. Kassouf (2001) also shows that urban 
children tend to work more than children in the rural sector.
The contribution of the income obtained by the children for the household income is 
significant especially because per capita income in such families is very low. For 
example, in 35% of the urban families and in 46% of the rural families, the contribution 
of child income to the household income is greater than 20%, while for more than 10% of 
the urban families and 17% of the rural families, this contribution is larger than 40%. 
These data suggest that abolishing child labour in Brazil may not be a viable strategy, as 
it might even worsen poverty in the country. Instead, a policy option could be based in 
programs such as the so-called bolsa-escola, in which children aged between 6 and 15 
years regularly enrolled in school enabled their families to receive a bonus from the 
government to increase their household income. To qualify for this program, families 
should have per capita income lower than a minimum wage. This program has been 
shown to be effective in reducing child labour while at the same time contributing to 
improve school attendance for the poorest children.
The ILO has acted in Latin America with the aim of promoting employment creation and 
improving labour relations among employers and employees. This line of action is in 
accordance with the international debate on labour standards which has focused on a set 
of internationally agreed upon “core labour standards” including: (1) the freedom of 
association (consisting of the right to unionize and the right to collective bargaining); (2)
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the elimination of all forms of forced labour; (3) the effective abolition of child labour; 
and (4) the elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation.
These core labour standards have been defined in a number of ILO conventions dating 
from 1930 on. However, not all countries have ratified them and even where ratification 
has taken place, sometimes implementation and enforcement have been problematic. In 
June 1998, the ILO adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work in order to revive interest in adopting and ratifying these conventions and to signal 
a strategic shift towards more flexible implementation and a greater emphasis on 
technical assistance. The Declaration includes an obligation on the part of ELO members 
to promote and realize the four core labour standards identified above. It recognizes the 
obligation of the ILO to assist its member countries to attain the objectives of the 
Declaration. It also encourages other international organizations to support these efforts 
by offering technical assistance and by helping member countries to create a climate for 
economic and social development. The intent of the Declaration is to ensure that the 
trend towards globalization is accompanied by social justice. However, it acknowledges 
that the comparative advantage of low-wage countries should not be called into question.
Debate on core labour standards has also become more prominent in the international 
arena and remains controversial. For example, some (largely developed) countries have 
expressed the view that if these standards were linked to trade regulations through the 
WTO, this would represent a powerful incentive for members to improve labour 
conditions. By contrast, many developing and some developed member states have 
maintained that the introduction of labour standards in trade negotiations would amount 
to protectionism and would undermine the comparative advantage of lower-wage trading 
partners.
In Brazil, the ILO regional office has supported four strategic projects which aim at:
1. Promoting the fundamental principles and rights at the workplace;
2. Creating better work opportunities for men and women;
3. Increasing the effectiveness of social protection programs;
4. Strengthening tripartite negotiations and social dialogue.
A summary with all actions and projects being carried out by the ILO office in Brazil 
appears in the annex. The measures regarding fundamental principles and rights at the 
workplace involve seminars, technical assistance to the labour ministry, training to labour 
unions and discussions with labour courts on issues related to labour legislation, child 
labour, freedom of association, sexual exploitation of youngsters, and slave work.
In the project of employment promotion, the ILO has interacted with the W orld Bank and 
the United Nations to publish and disseminate information about its project for support of 
juvenile employment; offered vocational training and certification for tourism workers; 
extended technical support for national institutions to develop training programs for 
disabled workers, and advice on the international norms on discrimination; and 
undertaken studies to subsidize microcredit programs.
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As for the project to expand the effectiveness of social protection programs, the measures 
taken involve seminars and conferences on work conditions and health care in the work 
environment; training for health inspectors; a joint program with the labour ministry to 
reduce accidents in the workplace, and prevent HIV contamination in Brazilian harbors; 
and a joint program with the education ministry to evaluate the performance of the “renda 
minima -  minimum income” project.
In the set of measures included in the project to strengthen tripartite dialogues the ILO 
has promoted joint conferences with UNICEF, ETHOS and UNIFEM on the benefits of 
tripartite negotiations; provided financial and technical support for studies about 
collective bargaining in the public sector; commissioned studies on the freedom of 
association in the métallurgie sector; and offered continuous support to actions and 
programs of Brazilian trade unions in the MERCOSUR.
In the next section, we discuss how labour is organized in Brazil, describing the main 
features of collective bargaining and labour legislation governing labour relations. The 
role of trade unions, the impact of labour laws on the functioning of the labour market, 
and the operation of labour courts are examined. The section draws on published 
information and interviews with employer and employee representatives.Labour 
Organization in Brazil
Effective and efficient labour adjustment requires a degree of labour market flexibility 
that in turn facilitates labour reallocation across regions, skills and types of employment. 
In this respect, labour contract legislation is critical because it largely determines the 
degree of market flexibility. In this section, we focus on the functions and on the 
characteristics of labour legislation in Brazilian labour markets. In particular, we 
investigate whether labour legislation has been responsible for increasing labour market 
rigidity, that is believed to be conducive to poverty while also favouring interest groups 
that tend to impede good economic performance and feed income inequality.
The basic legislation governing rural and urban labour was unified under the 1988 
Constitution. Before that, urban labour was regulated by the Consolidação das Leis do 
Trabalho (CLT) of 1943, while rural labour was governed by the Estatuto do 
Trabalhador Rural (ETR). The labour code has a very paternalistic character and was 
created under the general view that the State held sole responsibility for the protection of 
workers’ individual rights. Furthermore, the collective bargaining framework prevailing 
in Brazil is believed to be conducive to bad macroeconomic performance in terms of 
employment generation and inflation control [Carneiro (1999)]. Thus, it is important to 
understand how labour institutions operate in Brazil in order to understand the changes 
that have taken place in rural labour markets.
Labour contracts in Brazil are of two types: individual contracts and collective wage 
bargaining by rural workers’ unions. Individual contracts, which are either fixed-term or 
open-ended and must be registered in the labour card, guarantee all workers’ rights as 
established by the prevailing labour laws. Each worker is free to join a trade union. Trade 
unions for rural workers are organized on a territorial basis, centered around each 
municipality. Once a year, unions conduct collective wage negotiations on behalf of their
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members in the so-called base-dates (datas-bases). Non-unionized workers are afforded 
the same rights and benefits than union labour. It is estimated that in the Northeast alone, 
rural labour unions have more than 1,400 local-level affiliates representing more than five 
and a half million members in the nine states of the Northeast [Amadeo and Camargo 
(1993)].
Local trade unions are organized into state-level federations with departments responsible 
for legal rights, agricultural policy, land reform, education, and wom en’s organization. 
These federations in turn have a coordinating body at the national level, the 
Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura (CONTA G). This structure 
resembles that of urban workers and their central labour unions, such as the Central 
Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) and the Central Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT). 
Overall, the normal unit of collective bargaining in Brazil is that of federations which 
represent the demands of an entire professional category in a given state. The effects of 
this sort of intermediate level of collective bargaining have been found to be negative in 
terms of economic performance [c.f., Calmfors and Driffill (1988)] whereas a more 
decentralized framework seems to yield better results [see W orld Bank (2000)].
Furthermore, the existence of a single piece of legislation concerning wages and terms of 
employment, as the one prevailing in Brazil in the form of the C LT, have been found to 
distort productivity [Heckman (1997)]. Economywide bargaining regulations in labour 
negotiations suppress the creation and use of situation-specific knowledge because the 
parties involved are not free to act on what they know is good in any specific context, as 
do government regulations of the employment contract. Rent seeking and not wealth 
creation is what emerges out of sectoral and national bargaining policies that favor some 
groups over others and draw government into wage and employment determination. On 
the other hand, there seems to be convincing evidence that decentralized bargaining with 
flexible labour markets are conducive to wealth creation and declining unemployment, 
which is believed to have a positive effect on poverty [World Bank (2000)].
The conditions of employment for farm workers are, in principle, the same as those for 
urban workers. The normal workweek is forty-four hours and the normal workday is 
eight hours. In addition, workers employed full time under individual or collective labour 
contracts are entitled thirty days of paid vacation a year (plus a special wage increase of 
30% of the wage in the vacation month). All other benefits allowed to urban workers are 
extended to rural workers, such as maternity and paternity leaves, family wage, education 
salary, Christmas bonus, annual bonus, etc. However, only a minority of the labour force 
actually enjoys the various benefits to which workers are entitled. This excludes casual 
labour and all other workers without formal contracts (those without signed labour cards). 
For instance, sharecroppers and workers who are paid by the day lack basic wage 
protection or access to the most basic social benefits. Furthermore, there are still 
significant disparities in conditions of employment between rural and urban areas.
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Box 1: The C u rren t Com position o f the Cost o f L abo u r in the F orm al Sector
Taxes and  W age D eductions (% )
A -  Social Contributions
Social Security 20.0
Severance Payment (FGTS) 8.0
Education Salary 2.5

















D -  Cumulative Effects
Groups A and B 13.7
FGTS over 13th Salary 0.9
Sub-Total D 14.6
Total 102.1
Source: Pastore (1994), based on the Constitution and CLT.
The total cost of hiring a formal employee in Brazil is of 102% of the basic salary, as 
illustrated in Box 1. Taxes and wage deductions to workers’ benefits comprise social 
contributions and the cost of time not worked. There is a social security tax composed of 
an employer contribution of 20% of the worker’s total wage, and an 8% to 10% employee 
contribution (depending on the wage level). Unemployment insurance is funded out of a 
contribution paid by the employee (PIS/PASEP). Brazil’s severance pay scheme (FGTS) 
is funded with an earmarked monthly wage deduction of 8%. Upon dismissal without just 
cause, the employer must make an additional contribution equivalent to 40% of the total 
balance of the FGTS account that accumulates the deposits (of 8% of the worker’s 
salary) made during the time of employment. This provision is believed to be a reverse 
incentive for workers to seek dismissal and the government is currently examining how to 
modify unemployment insurance and severance rules in Brazil.
Therefore, one can safely claim that labour legislation in Brazil is rather stringent. The 
government recognizes the need for further flexibilisation in the labour market and has
made efforts towards changes in labour legislation for that purpose. There is a Project o f  
Constitutional Amendment (PEC No 623 of 1998) being discussed in Congress that 
proposes several changes in the legislation regarding union organization and in the rules 
for collective contracts. Some of them are worth mentioning:
• extinction of the general concept of professional category which in practice means 
that trade unions will only represent their affiliated members;
• possibility of plant level unions;
• end of the “unicidade sindical” or monopoly union representation;
• end of legal power of the Labour Courts while retaining their standing to engage 
in voluntary arbitration in collective economic conflicts, at the request of the 
parties;
• possibility of dismissal by economic cause (without configuring dismissal without 
just cause);
• end of the union tax (“contribuição sindical”).
There are also proposals to ease the rules on temporary and part-time work. Some of 
these include: (i) a 50% discount on social contributions (SESI, SENAI, SENAC, 
SEBRAE, INCRA, education salary, accident insurance); and (ii) a reduction in FGTS 
deposits from 8% to 2% and the exemption of the 40% fine upon termination of the 
contract. The same proposal establishes that the workweek can have more than 44 hours 
and that the overtime worked can be compensated throughout the year. This, however, 
has to be ratified by means of a permanent change in the labour code.
If approved in Congress, the labour code reform will contribute to reduce uncertainty 
about labour costs for employers, create conditions for more durable employee-employers 
relationships by allowing contracts to be more flexible in response to changing work and 
market conditions, create the environment for more representative collective bargaining, 
ensure better enforcement of contracts, and reduce the incentives for jobs and people to 
migrate to the informal economy. Informal employment is by nature unprotected, offers 
worst working conditions, and concentrates most of the poor in the urban areas.
The role of the labour justice in Brazil has been the subject of intense debate among those 
who study the Brazilian labour market performance. Opinions differ on the impact of this 
institution on the performance of the labour market, but in general it is usually argued 
that the labour justice has an important role in protecting the less organised workers. 
However, few analysts have verified the effect of the institution’s role on the labour 
market as a whole and how it affects workers in general, especially the less skilled and 
organized workers in the long run. We turn to this issue in the following section.
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5. T he Functioning of Labour Courts
In what follows we draw on the findings of Camargo (2002) to understand how the 
functioning of the labour justice can interfere on the worker’s well being. The basic idea 
is that the way in which the labour justice operates creates important distortions in the 
labour market by sending the wrong incentives to workers and employers. These points 
are illustrated with findings based on a sample of labour justice cases in Minas Gerais.
The labour justice has three important functions in the Brazilian labour relations system: 
enforcement, conflict resolution in individual and collective contracts, and arbitration. At 
the individual level, all settlements between employees and employers regarding disputes 
on individual and/or law contracts fulfilment are only valid if achieved through the 
Labour Courts. This implies that a dismissal must be made in the presence of a judicial 
authority, if the employer wants to ensure that the employee will not claim rights that 
were not received during employment.
Since 1988, an employee has a period of five years to place a claim in the Labour Justice. 
If a case is filed against the employer, he/she is the one who has to bear the onus of the 
proof of innocence. If that cannot be done, the labour court promotes a “conciliation” 
between the parties and in case of no consensus, the judge is free to decide if the claim is 
legitimate. If the judge rules in favor of the employee, the employer will have to pay the 
employee’s demands.
On collective bargaining the main role of the Courts is to promote conciliation and give 
judgement in disputes within its jurisdiction and, moreover, to verify that signed 
collective contracts are complied with. In collective bargaining, when there is an impasse, 
either parties can unilaterally call for a “Dissídio” or arbitration. The dispute is then sent 
to the Labour Justice for the area where the negotiation is taking place and this becomes 
the new locus of the negotiation. In case there is an impasse here, it is up to the judge to 
decide the terms to the contract. In collective contract disputes, not only the Labour 
Courts are involved but also the labour union and the employer. In this case it is also the 
employer’s duty to prove that the law and the collective contracts established have been 
followed.
Arbitration doesn’t follow pre-defined rules or principles. When the dispute is about the 
non-fulfilment of the law, arbitration is based on the law. However legislation on 
collective contracts is not as detailed as legislation on individual contracts. Because of 
this, many times the Brazilian Labour Justice adopts norms that are the equivalent of 
laws. In this case it can be said that previous decisions may be used as a guide but many 
times the trial is based on political factors. This means that the labour justice may 
interfere in private contracts between employers and employees, having them modified 
through its rulings.
It is worth emphasizing one implicit but extremely relevant point above. There are always 
negotiations! Therefore, clauses in an individual contract protected by law are included.
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In reality, most of the demands and, therefore, of the rights negotiated, refer to individual 
rights enrolled in the CLT and/or the Constitution. Table 2 below demonstrates this, 
based on a sample of processes from Minas Gerais’ labour courts.
Table 2 - R ights C ontested  in L ab o u r C ourts 1995
Rights Percentage
FGTS payment 30
Payment of 40% fine to FGTS for dismissal 35
Over time payment 65
Commission 5
Payment of 13th salary 65
Vacation 60
Unpaid or late salaries 25
Non fulfilment of clauses in collective contracts 20
Payment for notification before dismissal 62
Night shift additional payment 12
Family pension payment 10
Employees demanding a written contract 10
Gratuities 22
Other rights 10
Source: Camargo (2002) based on the author’s study o f  2 00  cases in the labour justice system  o f  M inas 
Gerais state. Note: In the sam e process the em ployee can demand for more than one right and usually does  
it.
The most important aspect of the argument above is that only 20 percent of the processes 
demand the fulfilment of any clause of a collective contract; the other 80 percent are 
related to the non-fulfilment of an individual employee right foreseen in the law. The 
most frequently contested rights were payment of overtime wages, thirteenth salary 
payment and paid vacations, followed by claims of non-payment of FGTS and the 40 
percent fine of FGTS balances in case of dismissal without just cause.1
What the data show is that there is a large fraction (80 percent or so) of disputes that is 
taken to labour courts for clauses already foreseen in the law. As mentioned before, the 
regular procedure is to come up with an agreement between the parties. In other words, 
this procedure means that the possibility of negotiation of individual clauses foreseen by 
the law is made available to employees and employers.
In the case of collective contracts, the negotiation occurs between the labour unions and 
the companies, or between the labour unions and the employer federations. The clauses in 
the collective contracts must be more favorable to the workers than the individual rights 
accorded in the legislation. However, no individual contract can stipulate less rights than 
those stipulated in collective contracts signed by the union where the work is performed. 
At any given time along the negotiation of a collective contract between a group of
1 It is worth mentioning that In the sam e process the em ployee can demand for more than one claim  and 
usually does so.
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workers and a company or a group of companies, any of the parties may unilaterally 
summon a “dissídio” or agreement, having the negotiation transferred to the court room, 
giving it the power to arbitrate the dispute.
Other relevant information about the functioning of justice is the non-existence of a viés 
pró  one of the parties involved. Table 3 presents the distribution of judgments according 
to the “winning” party. The data shows that more than 60 percent of the disputes that are 
not decided at the conciliation stage, are decided in part in favour of the workers and in 
part in favour of the company. A lower and apparently declining percentage is resolved 
entirely in favour of the worker (between 10 and 20 percent of the cases), while the 
percentage of cases entirely resolved in favour of the employers is between 14 and 32 
percent.
Since there is no formal rule to be followed by the judge to pronounce the sentences, the 
results above can have at least two interpretations: first, they might suggest that the judge 
tends to make a division considered “fair” by him of the demands, in a way that both 
agents, employers and employees, receive a share of the result; a second interpretation 
would be that workers tend to demand more than they deserve and that the judge is 
simply applying the law. With the available data it is impossible to decide which 
interpretation is correct.
Table 3 - A cceptance o f  Claim s by the Labour Justice 
_____________(local level in M inas Gerais)_____________









Capital -  B elo  H orizonte 16.7 69 .0 14.4
1991 Province 19.7 63.8 16.5
Total 20.3 64.2 15.5
Capital -  B e lo  Horizonte 15.2 67.2 12.4
1992 Province 16.6 64.2 19.3
Total 15.8 65.2 18.6
Capital -  B elo  H orizonte 12.0 67.7 20.3
1993 Province 15.1 63.4 21.5
Total 13.8 64.7 21 .6
Capital -  B e lo  H orizonte 10.6 68.1 21.3
1994 Province 12.1 55.8 32 .0
Total 14.5 65.3 20 .2
Source: Labour Justice annual report, Third Region, Minas Gerais
6; How Labour Relations Are Affected by the Functioning of the
Courts
From the previous discussion it is obvious that the functioning of labour courts affect the 
relations between employers and workers. On the one hand, employers have no incentive
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to comply with the law and pay workers’ rights. If they do not do it, they can negotiate 
the amount of the benefits at the Labour Justice and— in the worst case— they will have 
to pay the same amount they would have paid along the working relation. This strategy 
tends to be more effective when work contracts are informal since that with a formal 
contract it is easier to solve the dispute in favour of the worker. This way, one of the main 
problems of the functioning of the Brazilian labour justice is to induce informal work 
contracts. As it is well known, informality is closely related to bad working conditions 
and the informal sector is where most of the poor can be found.
On the other hand, in the game of evading the legal workers’ rights, the worker knows 
that a liability exists and that it has been accumulated by the employer and that some of 
this liability will be taken by him/her when demanded in court. This means that as the 
working relation grows, the incentive for the worker to go to court increases too. If it is 
done while he/she is working, he/she is dismissed with difficulty. This way, instead of 
going to court while working, the worker starts to force a dismissal, becoming 
increasingly uncooperative in the working relation. Therefore, many times, the demand 
occurs when the working relation has already been disrupted.
Since the employer knows that as the working relation grows, the incentive for the 
employee to have a free-rider attitude, shirking and become less cooperative increases, 
the employer has no incentive to invest in training since there is a growing possibility of 
losing the investment when it is time to dismiss him/her, what results in low levels of 
productivity and therefore low real wages.
For workers with low bargaining power there is a tendency to use the labour justice as a 
tool for compensation. Given the reduced probability of having a demand accepted by the 
employer, which in many instances is aggravated by an absence of trade unions, it is left 
for these workers to take their demands to court. Table 4 reveals that, in fact, the profile 
of workers who mostly go to court is in accordance with the profile of the worker with 
low bargaining power.
Table 4  - W orkers G oing to Labour Courts by W age L evel
W age interval (minimum  
wage)
W orkers at Labour Justice
(% )
All workers in Southeast 
Region (%) 1993
1 to 2 70 4 7 .0
2 to 5 26 26.9
5 to 10 2.5 9.7
M ore than 10 1.5 6.4
Average 2.1 m inim um  w age 3.7 m inim um  w age
Source: Camargo (2002) based on the author’s research on 200  processes at Labour Courts in M inas Gerais 
and in the P N A D  survey, 1993
A similar behaviour is observed in the case of collective contracts. That is, there is an 
incentive for the weaker party to summon an agreement and to have the negotiation 
transferred to the labour justice, transforming the result of any collective dispute between 
employers and the union in a matter of justice and not the result of a dispute settled by the 
bargaining power between the parties. The main consequence is the deterioration of the 
collective bargaining process, an incentive to informality with an important effect on 
poverty that can be translated into a rigidity in poverty rates even in periods of prosperous 
economic performance, as it seems to be the case in many occasions in Brazil.
13
In the next section we assess the issue of informal employment in Brazil. The idea is to 
review the main findings in the literature on the characteristics of the informal labour 
market and draw some conclusions as regards the existence of segmentation or whether 
different types of workers rationally choose to be in the informal sector and the 
connection of informality with poverty.
7. Informal Labour Relations
Informal employment, which is outside the protection of any state employment and social 
protection system, is endemic in many developing and newly industrialising economies. 
An established view in the literature is that the informal sector acts as a buffer between 
formal employment and open unemployment and, consequently, as formal sector jobs are 
destroyed during restructuring or recession, informal employment rises (Tokman 1992, 
Portes and Shaunffler 1993). Another traditional way of looking into the issue of why 
informal labour markets exist is through considering the hypothesis of labour market 
segmentation. In the presence of segmentation rewards in the different sectors of the 
economy differ for workers of equal potential productivity and, in this context, the 
existence of a dual labour market would be consistent with dualism in earnings as long as 
workers with similar characteristics are paid different wages according to the sector in 
which they work (Dickens and Lang, 1985). In both cases, the informal sector represents 
the disadvantaged sector in a dualistic labour market, where most of the poor can be 
found.
However these traditional views fail to offer much insight into the structural growth in 
the size of the informal sector. Recent work for a number of developing countries 
suggests that informal employment may in fact be a desirable choice for workers, because 
formal sector protection is often inefficient and therefore ineffective, and refutes a 
traditional segmented, non-competing groups understanding of the relationship between 
the two sectors (Maloney 1999, Funkhouser 1996, M arcoullier et al. 1997, and Saavedra 
and Chong 1999). Assuming a standard neoclassical labour market, earnings and 
occupational choice would only reflect different amounts of inherited characteristics and 
of investment in human capital. Thus, if workers in the informal sector are paid lower 
wages, this is because they are less educated or less experienced and/or their human 
capital endowment might have had an influence in their occupational choice, and not 
because the two sectors present different wage determination processes. In this case, the 
labour market for relatively unskilled workers may be seen as integrated with the formal 
sector, offering desirable jobs with distinct characteristics from which workers may 
choose with little queuing (Maloney 1999).
Large informal sectors, in which workers are employed without social security and other 
employment protection, play an increasingly important economic role in many 
developing economics. Estimates point to variation in the size of the informal sector, but 
generally reveal that its size is significant. So for example, comparing Central American 
economies for the early 1990s, Funkhauser (1996) reports that the informal sector varies 
from a third of total employment (Costa Rica) to nearly two-thirds (Nicaragua). 
Marcouillier et al. (1997) report that the informal sector in Peru was as high as 62% of
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total employment in 1985/86, and 63% in El Salvador in 1990. Informality is generally 
more widespread amongst female workers. Estimates, however, vary because there is no 
firm agreement on how to define informal status. Some commentators argue that all self- 
employed workers should be regarded as in the informal sector, others focus on the 
numbers who are working but not paying social security contributions and therefore fall 
outside any systems of employment and social protection.
A useful indicator of informal employment status is the lack of social insurance or social 
protection. In Brazil this is indicated by the absence of a signed labour card (“carteira de 
trabalho assinada”), as required by the Labour Code. This is the empirical definition used 
by most authors in Brazil. The growth in employment of this form has been rapid in the 
country, whilst numbers in formal employment have remained fairly static. From an 
economically active population of 18 million in 2000, 4.5 million were employed in the 
informal sector. The relative growth in the informal sector has been rapid from 17% of 
the economically active population in 1990 to 27% in 2000, and this growth appears to be 
structural rather than cyclical (Carneiro 1997).
Do workers choose informal employment or are they “pushed” into the informal sector 
because of the relative abundance of such jobs or as an alternative to open 
unemployment? Recent work for a number of developing countries suggests that informal 
employment may in fact be a desirable choice (Maloney 1999). A number of studies find 
evidence that accounting for sample selectivity between informal and formal status has a 
significant influence on earnings in the informal sector (Pradhan and van Soest, 1995 
(Bolivia); Cohen and House, 1996 (Sudan); Marcoullier et al., 1997 (El Salvador and 
Mexico); Saavedra and Chong, 1999 (Peru)). This suggests that informal workers faced 
an improved wage offer in the informal sector and therefore that employment in the 
informal sector may be a rational choice, rather than the result of displacement. Indeed 
this is reinforced by Pradhan and van Soest (1997), also researching in a Latin American 
context, who find evidence of substantial household labour supply substitution between 
the two sectors. Low formal sector wages do in fact encourage participation in the 
informal sector.
The issue of why workers enter informal employment has been addressed by examining 
transition or migration behaviour. Banerjee (1983) investigates migration decisions by 
Indian workers from formal rural employment to informal urban employment. His 
evidence suggests that a significant proportion of migrants move because of a firm 
(informal sector) job offer or because of established urban contacts that are expected to 
lead to an (informal sector) employment offer. Migration does not appear to take place in 
order to facilitate job search in the urban economy. Maloney (1999) also questions 
dualistic theories of the informal sector, by examining sectoral transitions in the Mexican 
labour market in the early 1990s. In particular workers who move from the formal sector 
to self-employed informal activity appear to enjoy substantial improvements in earnings, 
and workers who make the reverse transition appear to suffer significant loss of earnings. 
Maloney argues that these findings point to the desirability of the informal sector as a 
destination.
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Turning to the case of Brazil, some previous research has addressed the question of what 
determines whether a worker is likely to be in the informal sector. Fernandes (1996), 
using data for 1989, finds that both age and education are important. Informal status 
decreases with age up to 42 years and rises thereafter. Increased educational attainment 
reduces the probability of informal status. These conclusions are consistent with those 
found for other Latin American countries (Funkhouser, 1996; Saavedra and Chong, 
1999). Sedlacek et al. (1990) investigate transitions into the informal sector using a 
survey conducted in São Paulo. They reported that unpaid workers move 
disproportionately into the informal sector, which suggests that while in school and just 
after completing school, many individuals help out at the family business and eventually 
get paid. They spend on average only two years doing this before moving onto other paid 
work.
Even if this pattern of graduation from school to unpaid work and on to informal salaried 
work and then other contracted work represents the queuing that the dualistic literature 
might predict, the time spent in informal salaried work is not very long. It is not 
dissimilar to patterns observed in industrialized countries. Maloney (1999), for example, 
reports that median tenure of workers in the United States aged 16 to 24 years old is only
1.4 years and for workers aged 25 to 34 years 3.4 years. As for the conditional formal- 
informal earnings differential in Brazil, Fernandes (1996) finds that this is for men 
relative to women and that the differential tends to rise with schooling at a rate of 2.7% 
per additional year of schooling. Other earlier evidence confirms that earnings 
differentials are significant between the formal and informal sectors, ranging from 30% in 
the early 1980s to 45% in the early 1990s in favor of formal employment (Pero 1992, and 
Cacciamali and Fernandes 1993). However these results must be treated with 
considerable caution because of the absence of any correction for selection by sector.
More recently, Carneiro and Henley (2002) and Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002) 
investigated the determinants of the selection of workers into formal or informal 
employment, and the relative impacts of different labour market factors on earnings in the 
two states. The aims of these papers were (i) to assess whether the size of the earnings 
differential between the informal and formal sectors can explain the choice between 
informal and formal employment, and (ii) to analyse the determinants of that wage 
differential. Their results indicate that employment in the informal sector appears to be 
the outcome of a rational choice. This conclusion is reinforced by results where the 
earnings differential between informal and formal workers has a strong, statistically 
significant effect on the probability of working in the informal sector. According to 
Carneiro and Henley (2002), a 1 per cent narrowing in the wage gap between formal and 
informal workers raises the probability of informal status by 0.22 percentage points. So 
an increased rate of social security contribution in the formal sector, with no associated 
perceived improvement in the quality and efficiency of social protection, thus narrowing 
the wage gap is likely to lead to an increase in the relative size of the informal sector. 
Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002) complement these findings by showing that the sector 
selection occurs at the top of the wage distribution while segmentation prevails at the 
bottom, in line with the traditional dualistic view of the informal sector in Latin America.
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Carneiro and Henley (2002) also find that almost two-thirds of the unconditional mean 
wage differential between formal and informal workers is explained by differences in 
human capital and other modelled endowments, with the remaining third due to the lower 
rates of return that informal sector workers receive for particular characteristics. However 
it is clear from their data that informality extends across all levels of educational 
attainment and experience, although highly qualified and experienced informal workers 
are relatively less common than those in the formal sector.
Nevertheless the authors conclude that these results support the recent conclusions of 
Marcoullier et al. (1997), Saavedra and Chong (1999) and M aloney (1999) that informal 
employment may be a desirable form of labour market status for workers in developing 
economies, rather than informal employment arising from structural segmentation of the 
labour market into two non-competing groups. As to explanations for the growth in the 
size of the informal sector in developing economies, their results suggest that some of the 
strongest influences might arise from industrial restructuring away from manufacturing 
towards services, from changes in unionisation, and from changes in methods of payment 
from traditional waged employment towards pay related to worker performance or 
productivity. Attempts to reduce the burden of social security deductions on formal sector 
workers, as recently introduced in Brazil, should have a quantitative impact on reducing 
the size of the informal sector by reducing its relative attractiveness in terms of expected 
earnings. It has been shown that labour market segmentation may diminish the return to 
human capital for some groups relative to others and become an important determinant of 
who is poor (as shown by Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002), those will most likely be the 
ones in the bottom of the wage distribution). Further, the under-utilisation of human 
capital may have a negative impact on economic performance and a poorly functioning 
labour market may hamper the ability of the economy to respond to economic reforms or 
adjust to economic shocks.
The next section reviews results of an innovative analysis of the labour market that 
differentiates between periods of segmentation and integration. The findings are due to 
Fiess et al. (2002), who argue that the informal sector may very well be a dynamic and 
entrepreneurial sector, but one which also contains unfortunate workers holding poor 
jobs. The relative shares of voluntary and involuntary workers will reflect the degree of 
segmentation in the labour market which can vary depending on the shocks to the 
economy. And depending upon the general health of the economy, one of these 
phenomena may dominate the other.
8. LabourMarket A djustment and E conomic Performance
As argued in the previous sections, there are different definitions of informality in the 
development economics literature. Some of these criteria overlap in practice. Just as there 
are more than one criteria for an empirical delineation of the formal from the informal 
sector, there are different interpretations of why informality arises in the first place. 
These can be classified into two categories. The traditional “dualistic” view sees the 
informal sector as the residual of a highly distorted labour market in the formal sector. 
Unions and/or government regulation push wages above their equilibrium level, rationing 
workers into the informal sector where they are not protected by labour legislation. Thus,
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distorting labour market regulations are the cause for a formal-informal segmentation of 
the labour market. As part of this segmentation, relative wages and relative employment 
shares of the formal and informal sector move in opposite directions.
As pointed out by Carneiro and Henley (2002), a more recent line of thought presents the 
view that, as a first approximation, the informal sector could be treated as an 
unregulated/unprotected entrepreneurial sector that offers work and working conditions 
that are desirable to many workers. This rationality could be related to elements like the 
desire of independence and/or the misalignment of implicit and explicit labour taxes with 
perceived benefits. This “integrated labour markets” view stands in sharp contrast with 
the dualistic view.
Using modem econometric time series techniques on quarterly data for the cases of 
Mexico, Brazil and Colombia, Fiess et al. (2002) explored the nature of the long run 
relationship among relative earnings, relative sector size and the real exchange rate with 
the aim of establishing the degree of dualism in their labour markets. This exercise can 
provide a preliminary answer to the question of whether and to what degree are the labour 
markets in these three countries “flexible” in the broadest terms, viz., whether key 
earnings and employment indicators respond to macroeconomic shocks in a manner that 
is consistent with efficient functioning of markets.
Figure 1 displays the time series of the three variables under consideration for the three 
countries respectively. In what follows, we limit ourselves to a qualitative presentation of 
the results and refer the reader to Fiess et al. (2002) for technical details. The period 
under consideration runs from 1985:Q1 to 1999:Q2 for Colombia, from 1987:Q1 to 
I999:Q1 for Mexico and from 1992.Q1 to 2000:Q4 for Brazil. By looking first at the 
whole sample, we find that for Mexico the test of integrated markets can be strongly 
rejected while the test of segmentation cannot be rejected. For Brazil, the hypothesis of 
integration cannot be rejected and the hypothesis of segmentation is rejected at the 1% 
level. For Colombia, the hypothesis of segmentation cannot be rejected while the 
hypothesis of integration can be.
In all three cases, however, tests of the existence of an equilibrium relationship among 
the three variables suggest the possibility of different relationships in different sub­
periods. This finding is consistent with the previous argument that rigidities in the formal 
sector may be binding in some periods and not in others, depending on the 
macroeconomic environment.
For Mexico, the segmentation hypothesis is only accepted from 1995 onwards and the 
hypothesis of integration cannot be rejected prior to 1995. This suggests that the Mexican 
labour market behaves pretty much like a flexible market in the recovery period leading 
up to 1995.
For Colombia, statistical tests support the hypothesis of a segmented labour market post 
1995 onwards and never support the view of integration for any sub-sample. These
2 The m ethodology invo lves the estim ation o f  long run cointegration vectors using the multivariate 
approach proposed by Johansen (1988 ).
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findings are in accordance with the view that regulations in the Colombian labour market 
are binding strongly and that the dualistic view reflects relatively well its functioning.
In Brazil, despite full sample evidence of integration, there is evidence of segmentation 
during the pre-Real plan period and in the post Asian crisis period (see Figure 2). These 
findings indicate that the labour market nature in Brazil is likely to have changed over the 
decade.
Figure 1: Real Effective Exchange Rate, Relative W age and Share o f Inform al W orkers
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Source: Fiess, Fugazza and Maloney (2002)
Figure 2: Som e Evidence for Segm entation in Brazil
A recursive test of segmentation in Brazil
Note: Figure 2 shows a recursive test o f the hypothesis o f segmentation in the Brazilian labour market. The hypothesis of 
segmentation cannot be rejected for test statistics below 1 and the shaded areas are thus indicative for segmentation. Starting with an 
original sample from 1982:01 to 1989:04, the estimation period is increased by one observation at a time and the corresponding test 
statistic is calculated. It is important to realize that the periods where the hypothesis is rejected do not indicate exact break points. 
M uch rather, they reveal what a researcher would find if she had only access to data stretching from 1982:01 to the specific point in 
time where the test statistic is calculated.
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Fiess et al. (2002) argue that there is a wide spectrum of causes of real exchange rate 
movements which correspond to a specific macroeconomic environment and labour 
market behavior. These are:
• a real depreciation (non-traded goods become less expensive relative to traded 
goods) with evidence of segmentation could be the outcome of either a negative 
shock to the traded-goods sector, or a shift in preferences towards traded-goods, 
or a rise in the real interest rate
• a real appreciation with evidence of segmentation could only be the outcome of a 
negative shock to the non-traded goods sector
• a real depreciation with evidence of integration could be the outcome either of a 
positive shock to the non-traded goods sector, or of a negative shock to the traded 
goods sector, or a shift in preferences towards traded-goods, or of a rise in the real 
interest rate
• a real appreciation with evidence of integration could be the outcome of either a 
positive shock to the traded-goods sector, or a negative shock to the non-traded 
goods sector, or a shift in preferences towards non-traded goods or a fall in the 
real interest rate
By examining the data for Brazil, the period between 1990-93, also known as the Collor 
period, is characterized by evidence of a segmented labour market. We also have that the 
price of non-traded relative to traded goods is falling dramatically. The real interest rate 
remains at very high levels. All these elements seem to indicate that through this period 
the formal sector was undergoing a negative shock or at least was behaving as if. The fact 
that the economy was opening progressively and in a credible manner makes this 
explanation quite plausible. The end of the Collor period brought back some positive 
growth prospects and the labour market appeared to be less segmented. At the same time 
the real exchange rate path was reverted. As real interests rates remained very high, 
essentially because of the return of hyper-inflation, a possible explanation of the 
phenomenon could be a shift in preferences towards the non-traded goods sector.
The Real Plan implemented in 1994 has been a path-breaking economic event. After a 
relatively short period of adjustment, characterized by segmentation in the labour market 
due to a substantial rise in labour costs brought about by a fall in inflation which led to 
depreciation, we observe a sharp increase in the relative price of non-traded goods 
essentially driven by a surge in consumption. The latter was due to the fall in the cost of 
holding money, the relaxation of liquidity constraints and increased access to credit 
brought about by financial liberalization. There is no clear evidence of any positive shock 
to the traded goods sector. On the contrary, productivity improvements appear to have 
been the consequence of lower worker participation in that sector. The expansion of the 
informal sector together perhaps with a possible positive shock could have explained the 
fall, even though not a dramatic one, of the relative price of non-traded goods in the 
period leading up to the Asian crisis, the Russian crisis and the subsequent recession 
period that includes the devaluation of January 1999. Again labour regulations appear to
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have been binding beginning in late 1997. Even though the economy as a whole has been 
hit by these external shocks, the formal sector which was more exposed to foreign 
investments may have suffered the most.
The year of 1998 is characterized by negative growth rates, a falling relative price of non­
traded goods in terms of traded goods, falling self-employed earnings relative to formal 
wages and an increasing participation in the informal sector. These elements corroborate 
evidence of a predominant negative shock to the formal sector which has led to a higher 
degree of segmentation in the labour market. The first signs of overall economic recovery 
are perceived in late 1998 and are strengthened by the devaluation that occurred at the 
beginning of 1999. There is some evidence of an industry-led recovery which explains 
the reverted tendency in the real exchange rate. W e may also interpret the real 
appreciation as the outcome of a negative shock to the non-traded goods sector as there is 
still some evidence of a segmented labour market to date. The contribution to gross 
domestic product of the industrial sector has risen from 34.6 % in 1998 to 35.5 % in 1999 
while that of the services sector has fallen from 62.3 % in 1998 to 61.1 in 1999. These 
tendencies were maintained in 2000. GDP growth has jum ped to more than 4% and the 
relative size of the formal sector has increased in terms of the size of the informal sector. 
The degree of segmentation has fallen since 1999 and there is some evidence of the return 
of job creating growth after a mitigated decade.
The 1990s have been characterized by a growing informal sector. This trend has not 
exclusively been the result of an increasing degree of segmentation in the labour market. 
Rather it has been the result of the conjunction of a series of economic events that hit 
negatively and predominantly the formal sector and of always threateningly binding 
labour legislation. In addition, a general shift of preferences in favor of non-traded goods 
also has contributed to this pattern in the composition of the economic activity.
9. The Social Safety Net
In this section we focus on the system of benefits that form the social safety net in Brazil. 
These include the unemployment insurance and the severance fund, which are the most 
significant benefits targeted to help unemployed workers. The Brazilian unemployment 
insurance (UI) system is the largest in Latin America, serving an average of 300,000 to 
400,000 beneficiaries each month. According to Law No. 7998 from 1990 the objective 
of the Brazilian unemployment system is to: (1) provide temporary financial assistance to 
a worker dismissed without just cause and (2) assist workers in their search for a new job. 
Concerning the provision of financial assistance to the worker, the law is silent on 
whether UI benefits are aimed at smoothing consumption or are primarily intended to 
prevent unemployed workers from falling into poverty.
The main difference between consumption smoothing and safety-net oriented 
unemployment insurance systems lies in replacement ratio and depth of coverage. 
Unemployment insurance systems which primarily focus on consumption smoothing 
generally aim at a high replacement ratio of the previous income. Such systems are often 
restricted to unemployed workers, who have been employed during a substantial period 
of time before becoming unemployed. UI programs that emphasize a social net objective
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generally provide low levels of benefits, but cover a large fraction of the population. The 
Brazilian UI system is characterized by a low replacement ratio, short benefit duration 
and the fact that it is restricted to formal sector workers. The latter implies that UI is not 
accessible to over 50 percent of the workforce. A further inconsistency with the social 
net objective arrives from the fact that receiving UI is conditional on having access to the 
severance fund - Fundo de Garantía do Tempo de Serviço (FGTS).
The FGTS was created in 1966 (Law No. 5107) by the military regime to serve as an 
alternative to the job  security law prevailing at that time. It is combined with a fine that 
employers have to pay if they dismiss a worker without just cause. For a long time the 
FGTS was the only labour market institution that provided income to the workers at the 
moment they were laid off without just cause. And even nowadays, this aspect of the 
FGTS is important. UI benefits in Brazil are low and do not exceed two minimum 
wages. As a consequence, the amount worker receives from their fund at the moment 
they become unemployed is likely to exceed unemployment benefits by far.
W hile formal sector workers are less likely to become unemployed than informal wage 
earners ceteris paribus, they are more likely to remain unemployed once they have lost 
their job. Unemployment duration among formal sector workers is higher for those who 
received FGTS before becoming unemployed. This may hint at the fact that only the 
“rich” can afford a longer unemployment duration. However, this kind of statement 
should be treated with care. Formal sector workers may just face a longer unemployment 
duration as they are more selective when accepting a new job.
Domeland and Fiess (2001) provide evidence on this fact by estimating a competing risk 
model, which allows to consider not only unemployment duration, but also exit states. 
Independent of the exit state, formal sector workers are less likely to leave unemployment 
than informal wage earners. Among formal sector workers, FGTS (and hence UI) 
recipients are less likely to exit unemployment. This proves to be independent of the exit 
state. Thus, at least in terms of the employment sector, the unemployment insurance 
system seems to fail in its objective to assist workers in their search for new employment.
The Brazilian Unemployment Insurance System
The unemployment insurance program was already in the Constitution of 1946 but it was 
not before 1990 that this benefit became universally accessible. The current Brazilian 
unemployment system was created in 1986, within the context of the Cruzado Plan. Its 
success was rather limited due to strict eligibility criteria and severe fiscal limitations. In 
1988, the source of funding was changed from general Treasury revenues to the Fundo de 
Amparo ao Trabalhador (FAT).3 Eligibility criteria were relaxed in 1990 (Law No. 
7.998), expanding the base of workers with access to UI benefits. The benefit level was 
also increased. As a consequence, the number of checks distributed to the unemployed 
doubled. By 1990, unemployment insurance covered 43 percent of all dismissals from
The FAT is financed by a 0 .65  percent tax on revenues o f  private firm s, 1 percent tax on revenues o f  
public firms and a 1 percent o f  costs in non-profit firms. It then pays UI, the 13th w age (abono salarial), a 
fiscal stabilization fund, training in itiatives from  SE N A I/SE N A C  and the N ational D evelop m ent Bank  
(B N D E S), which receives 4 0  percent o f  the FAT.
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formal employment. In 1994, collection constraints and eligibility criteria were relaxed 
and potential payments were increased, extending the coverage of the program even 
further (Cunningham, 2000).
In order to become eligible for benefits, workers must meet the following criteria:
• Dismissal w ithout ju s t  cause by the employer or ind irect dism issal. Indirect 
dismissal refers to the fact that the employee requests dismissal from his job by 
court decision, claiming that his employer did not comply with the work contract.
• Employment under a form al lab o u r co n trac t for at least six months during the 
last three years or legal self-em ploym ent for at least 15 months.
• A period of unem ploym ent for at least seven and at most 120 days.4
• L ack  o f o ther sources of incom e to guarantee own subsistence and that of the 
family.
In order to make a claim for unemployment insurance benefits, a worker requires a form 
from his former employer specifying the time of service as well as earnings received in 
the three months prior to the dismissal. This form is reviewed by a national 
clearinghouse, which proves eligibility. Once accepted, the worker receives a proof of 
eligibility stating the value of benefits and the maximum benefit duration. In order to 
collect the monthly payment the worker must present this proof together with his signed 
work-card at a federal bank or employment office. After a successful claim, a worker 
will not be eligible again for 16 months.
The Severance Fund (FGTS)
In addition to unemployment insurance, dismissed workers receive the Fundo de 
Garantia por Tempo de Serviço (FGTS). The FGTS is an individualized interest-bearing 
fund. Each month the employer contributes the equivalent of 8 percent of his employee’s 
current wage to the fund. This implies that the amount accumulated per year in a 
worker’s fund corresponds approximately to one monthly wage. A worker has access to 
FTGS if dismissed without just cause, upon retirement or death, or as a means of co­
financing a private home purchase or high health expenses. The FTGS is transferable 
between jobs and bears interest if not accessed during a spell of unemployment.
In the case of dismissal without just cause (“sem justa causa”), the worker has not only 
the right to access his entire fund, including all funds accumulated during previous 
employment, but also receives a penalty in proportion to the accumulated FGTS in the 
job he is being dismissed from. This additional compensation amounted to 10 percent of
4 For those workers that go to court in order to cla im  dism issal with just cause or indirect d ism issal, this 
term starts at the end o f  the court d ecision  or legal ratification o f  the agreement.
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the worker’s FGTS balance at the time of dismissal and has been increased to 40 percent 
of the FGTS balance in 1988 and to 50 percent in 2001.5
For Brazil, the beginning of the 1990s seems to mark a pivot point for unemployment. 
While unemployment was on the decrease through the 1980s, the 1990s showed an 
increasing trend in unemployment. This change in the trend may have been due to a 
variety of factors such as the introduction of the Real Plan or the change in the 
Constitution in 1988. However, rather than investigating the causes of unemployment, 
we attempt to profile the unemployed in order to evaluate the Brazilian unemployment 
insurance system.
Figure 3 reveals the evolution of different unemployment rates for Brazil. The official 
unem ploym ent ra te  is measured for workers aged 15 to 65 who are unemployed in the 
reference period and who have been searching for employment during the last four 
weeks. This unemployment rate increased from 4 percent in February 1990 to 7 percent 
in May 1992. The Real Plan brought a short reduction in unemployment, leading to a 
decline in the official rate to 4 percent in December 1994. After the Asian crisis (October 
1997) unemployment rates started to climb again reaching 10 percent in March 2000.
U nem ploym ent of younger w orkers is measured as the official unemployment rate of 
workers who are between 15 to 24 years old. At the beginning of the 1990s, this 
unemployment rate was about three times higher than the rate amongst workers older 
than 25. But this gap increased, such that at the beginning of the new millennium the 
unemployment rate of younger workers was about five times higher compared to that of 
older workers. It is important to keep in mind that the unemployment rate of younger 
workers reflects well the dynamics of the unemployment rate of labour market (re)- 
entrants, who do not have any access to unemployment insurance.
5 The FGTS fund is administrated by the governm ent. According to P aes de Barros et al. (1999), 
inefficiencies in the administration o f  the FTG S translate in investm ent returns w ell b e lo w  market rates and 
provide an incentive for workers to seek access to their funds by provoking their dism issal.
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U nem ploym ent by gender shows that female unemployment is almost 30 percent higher 
than male unemployment (Figure 4). In May 1998, the female unemployment rate 
reached its highest peak of the 1990s. From 1991 to May 1998 female unemployment 
rates faced on average an annual growth rate of 0.33, while the corresponding value for 
men was 0.002. The sharp increase in female unemployment may be partially explained 
by an increase in female labour force participation. From 1982 to 2000 the female labour 
force participation rate rose from 36 percent to 42 percent. Furthermore, the gender gap 
widened during periods of high unemployment. This may hint at a so-called added 
worker effect due to women entering the labour force during recessions as other family 
members especially their spouses become unemployed or face reduction in income, 
pushing unemployment rates even further up during recessions. On the other hand, it 
may indicate that women are more likely to be dismissed during recessions as tenure is 
usually shorter among women and hence the costs of dismissal in terms of the FGTS fine 
are lower for formal employers.
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U nem ploym ent ra tes by household sta tu s show that children of the household head 
face the highest unemployment rate. This is consistent with the above finding that 
unemployment rates for young workers are relatively high. However, this group faced 
the lowest increase in the unemployment rate due to the fact that unemployment of sons 
and daughter had been already at a high level of 9.38 in 1991. The unemployment rate of 
spouses more than doubled between 1991 and 1998, surpassing the unemployment rate of 
household heads in 1998.
Table 5 provides unem ploym ent ra tes  by d ifferen t educational level and household 
status. Workers with 9 to 11 years of education (completed secondary education) had the 
highest unemployment rate in May 1998. This group also faced the highest increase in 
the unemployment rate from 1991 to May 1998, followed by the lowest education group 
(primary I education). Hence from Table 4, we cannot deduce any clear relation between 
level of unemployment/change in unemployment and education.
T able 5 - U nem ploym ent Rates by Education and H ousehold Status
Characteristic 1991 1994 M ay, 1997 M ay, 1998 Change*
91-98
By Education
0- 4  years 3.88 4.03 4.41 6.66 71.65
5-8 years 7.03 7.03 8.41 10.10 43 .67
9-11 years 5.37 6 .00 7.39 10.28 91.43
12 or m ore years 2 .59 2.41 2 .66 4 .10 58 .30
By Household Status
Head 3.08 3 .22 3.68 5.42 75.97
Spouse 2.59 3.11 4 .42 6.43 148.26
Son/Daughter 9.38 9 .72 11.36 14.21 51 .49
Other 6.16 6.68 6.93 9.55 55 .03
*Change in percent. Source: IPEA/M inisterio do Trabalho (1998). PM E (selected years)
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10. A c tiv e  L abour M a r k e t P o l ic y  T a r g e tin g
Barros et al. (2002) have investigated the ability of active labour market policies in Brazil 
to target the right population. The authors defined compensatory policies as those based 
on transfers to ensure a minimum level of income for unemployed or low paid workers. 
The most important examples of such policies are unemployment insurance, FGTS and 
the wage bonus. The analysis of Brazilian policies in this group revealed two problems. 
First, the policies are badly targeted, generally catering employed workers or those with 
per-capita family incomes above the poverty line. Second, the authors show that the 
incentives generated by the presence of these programs may be seriously undermining 
labour market performance. In particular, Barros et al. (2002) argue that these programs 
could be major factors behind the high turnover rate and resulting low investment in 
human capital, low productivity and very low wage levels characteristic of the Brazilian 
labour force. W hether due to bad targeting or the perverse incentives they generate, these 
programs end up having much less of an impact on poverty than it would be possible if 
they were better designed.
The authors also defined distributive policies as those intended to raise the wages of less 
skilled workers and thereby reduce poverty, by regulating prices. This group includes all 
wage policies, especially the minimum wage. The analysis of the minimum wage showed 
firstly that its current level in Brazil is well below the international norm. More 
specifically, international comparisons suggest that the minimum wage in Brazil needs to 
be doubled to come into line with international standards. Additional evidence presented 
by Carneiro (2002) shows that minimum wage changes have a very limited impact in 
terms of poverty reduction, despite the fact that increases in the minim um wage impact 
those with the lowest wages and who are among the minorities in the labour market 
(female, young and black workers).
Barros et al. (2002) have also investigated the role of structural policies, which were 
defined as those aimed at reducing unemployment and enhancing labour productivity. 
Such policies may have one of the following four immediate objectives: (a) creation of a 
new job; (b) improvements in the quality of pre-existing jobs; (c) improvement of 
workers’ skills; or (d) better matching between workers and jobs. The analysis of these 
objectives showed that they depend both on macroeconomic policy -  particularly in 
setting interest rates -  and specific policies to ensure access for poor people to three 
services that are essential to income generation; (a) credit; (b) professional skill training; 
and (c) labour intermediation. Two of the most important programs along these lines in 
Brazil are the so-called PROGER (Programa de Geração de Emprego e Renda -  Program 
for Generation of Employment and Income), and PLANFOR (Programa Nacional de 
Qualificação do Trabalhador -  National Program for Enhancing W orkers’ Skills), both 
introduced in 1996 by the Labour Ministry.
The results of their investigation of the effectiveness of worker skill-training policies and 
labour intermediation revealed that the impact of these policies is very limited due to the 
way they are implemented. In the case of training, there have been numerous evaluations 
of PLANFOR and PROGER, including a series that track the subsequent development of 
course graduates. Some of these, apart from tracking course graduates, also include
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information on performance of a comparison group (e.g., Cardoso et al., 2002). The 
results of all the analyses with a comparison group, except one program in Pernambuco, 
suggest the impact on unemployment and income is quite small. An evaluation in Rio de 
Janeiro and Fortaleza showed that training programs had a positive and statistically 
significant impact on unemployment, but not on incomes of those already employed: 
those with access to training were 3-4 percent more likely to be employed six to 12 
months afterwards, but there was no impact on wages of those employed already. As the 
program costs about R$170 per person, the new jobs for participants need to last more 
than 17 months for the program to have a net positive benefit.
Evaluations of labour intermediation services are less common. A recent assessment by 
IPEA and FIPE based on PME longitudinal data tracked the labor market performance of 
two groups of previously unemployed workers for two months: unemployed workers who 
sought labor intermediation in the week of the interview and those who did not. Those 
who sought these performed better than those who did not in just two of the six 
Metropolitan regions investigated (Belo Horizonte and Salvador). Even in these regions, 
the impact was such that those who sought work ended with a employment rate 2-3 
percentage points higher, and a rate of formality 3-6 percentage points higher than those 
that did not use intermediation services. These results suggest that labor intermediation is 
important in terms of greater access to the formal sector, but not in reducing 
unemployment.
11. The Importance of Gender and Race in  Brazil
The existence and persistence of an earnings gap between men and women has been a 
subject of great interest to labour economists. Since the seminal papers by Oaxaca (1973) 
and Blinder (1973), hundreds of papers have been written about wage differentials in 
general, and male-female wage differentials in particular, using the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition technique. The objective is to further understanding of the raw gender 
wage differential, which universally shows that men are paid more than women, and try 
to account for the possibility that men, on average, may be endowed to a greater extent 
with characteristics that are rewarded in the labour market. The remaining unexplained 
component is then usually interpreted as the upper bound of discrimination against 
women. Whilst most of this type of analysis is traditionally performed on data from the 
US and to a lesser extent Europe, in the last ten years or so a growing literature has 
emerged using data from developing countries. This has become possible by the growing 
availability of socio-economic surveys.
Brazil is unique among the developing countries in the sense that they have a long 
tradition of collecting labour market data through surveys. The Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estastistica (The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) has been 
collecting the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios, PNAD, since 1976. The 
data is available for each year except the census years of 1980 and 1990 and for 1994, 
when for budgetary reasons the survey was not conducted. The PNAD is a nationally 
representative household survey using a consistent sampling methodology.
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The first studies on gender and the pay gap in Brazil date back to the mid-1980s 
[Camargo and Serrano (1983), Birdsall and Fox (1984), and Birdsall and Behrman 
(1985)]. In Camargo and Serrano (1983), the authors used data from the Labour 
M inistry’s survey of the formal labour market (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais -  
RAIS) for 1976 to estimate gender wage gaps for 22 sectors of Brazilian manufacturing. 
Their results suggested that education was the most important variable in the 
determination of wages for female workers as compared to males, while industry sector 
affiliation was the most important variable in the determination of wages for male 
workers.
In the other pioneer study, Birdsall and Fox (1984) look at male-female earnings among 
school- teachers. Using the 1% sample of the 1970 census they show that the mean 
income of female teachers is less that one half of that of male teachers. Using the male 
earnings regression as a base 81%, of the differential can be attributed to individual 
characteristics and 10% to discrimination. Nearly 8% of the differential is due to location 
since males tend to be concentrated more in higher paying geographical areas.
Birdsall and Berhman (1985) also used the above data set and estimated wage equations 
for male and females in urban Brazil. On average men earn about twice what women 
earn. The decomposition results indicate that elimination of discrimination might raise 
the (In) earnings of females by 22% in the formal sector, 72% in the informal sector, 44% 
in the domestic sector and 31% overall.
A World Bank sponsored research programme on women’s employment and pay in Latin 
America provides two additional case studies on gender earnings differentials in Brazil. 
In the first study Stelcner et al (1992) use a 3% sample of the 1980 Brazilian census 
containing 3.5 million individuals. They extract a sub-sample of 200000 individuals and 
using the Oaxaca decomposition their research offers the following insights. The national 
wage gap measured by comparing husband and wives is 29%. The decomposition reveals 
that the endowment component favors wives by 70% whilst husbands have a coefficients 
advantage of 170%. A similar pattern emerges when self-employed workers are 
considered. In the case of single workers the national wage gap is only 18% but the 
decomposition reveals that 21% of the differential is not explained by endowment 
differences. However, there seems to be a regional difference, namely that in the 
Northeast, women not only have an earnings advantage but also a coefficient advantage 
in the decomposition.
In the second case study, Tiefenthaler (1992) uses PNAD 1989 and estimates male and 
female earnings functions in three sectors: formal employment, informal employment and 
self-employment. The ratios of married female to male earnings in each sector are 0.7,
0.85 and 0.7 respectively. The ratios for single women are almost identical. The 
decomposition analysis reveals that, depending on specification of the model, between 
81-89% of the earnings differential of men versus women in the formal sector, 72-75% in 
the informal sector and 83-84% in the self-employment sector is attributed to the 
structure of rewards. Thus, Tiefenthaler concludes that discrimination plays a more 
important role in explaining male-female wage differentials in Brazil in 1989 than 
differences in characteristics.
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More recently, Loureiro and Carneiro (2001) investigated the existence of discrimination 
in the urban and rural labour markets in Brazil. The authors used the Blinder-Oaxaca 
(1973) decomposition analysis on data from the 1998 PNAD and concluded that there are 
substantial wage differentials between men and women by gender and race, besides the 
fact that wage differentials are not negligible between urban and rural workers.6
Leme and Wajnman (2000) present a comprehensive review of the main results as 
regards gender wage gap studies for the case of Brazil and point to the narrowing of wage 
differentials between men and women over the most recent period. A result that the 
authors claim is in line with a worldwide trend in terms of gender wage gaps. In their 
paper, the authors have used information on cohorts borne in 1952 and 1962 to identify 
the determinants of the narrower gender wage differentials over the period 1977 to 1997 
in Brazil. Their results, based on the standard Oaxaca decomposition, suggest that some 
17% of the male-female wage differential were eliminated over this period basically 
because of lower discrimination against women.
Evaluating and comparing the existing studies is difficult because they use different data 
sets and different specifications for the earnings function. However, it is clear that when 
we look at a single occupation, particularly an occupation such as teaching where public 
sector employment is very significant, then the finding that over 80% of the wage 
differential is attributed to endowment differences is not surprising. On the other hand 
when nationally representative samples for all the labour force are used, at least for the 
1980s, a large part of gender wage differentials remains unexplained. This might be taken 
as an upper bound for the extent of discrimination against females in Brazil.
Finally, the analysis presented in Arabsheibani et al. (2002) indicates that females have 
been very successful in narrowing the gender gap in recent years. Reductions in residual 
inequality, improvements in observable endowments and returns to those endowments 
have contributed positively to the reduction of the gap. However, according to the 
authors, it is the possible improvement in the unobservable endowment, for example 
quality of education, and/or reduction in discrimination per se which is the major cause of 
the falling gender wage gap. Most of this change has occurred between 1988 and 1992, 
partially cancelling out the adverse effect of deteriorating endowments for women 
relative to men in that period. The major contributor to the narrowing of the gap between 
1992 and 1998 is the improvement in the returns to those endowments. If the narrowing 
of the gap is the result of policy-driven reductions in discrimination, the Brazilian 
authorities have achieved much in elevating the position of females in the labour force.
12. The Impacts of G lobalisation on Poverty and Inequality
The impacts of globalisation, broadly defined as a comprehensive trade openness, have 
been investigated for the case of Brazil by Carneiro and Arbache (2002). These authors 
argue that after a decade marked by debt crisis, fiscal imbalances and rapidly accelerating 
inflation, the 1990s inaugurated a new policy agenda aimed at strengthening the trade
6 Sim ilar conclusions using a different data set have also been found by K assou f (1997 ).
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relationships among all capitalist economies. In their view, the links of a given economy 
with the rest of the world were supposedly to be strengthened by means of the adoption 
of the measures prescribed by the so called Washington Consensus. These involved in 
broad terms solving the fiscal crisis, stopping inflation and opening up the economy to 
foreign competition. In Brazil, these targets lead the government to introduce trade 
liberalization, deregulation of markets, privatisation of state enterprises and financial and 
capital market liberalization. It seems fair to state that the turn of the 1980s to the 1990s 
was a critical point of the recent Brazilian economic history.
As a result of the liberalizing measures adopted in the early 1990s, both imports and 
exports increased very rapidly, although the economy is still relatively closed to the rest 
of the world. Despite the growing exposure to foreign trade, output growth during most 
of the 1990s was mainly driven by domestic absorption. The output growth 
decomposition analysis carried out by Carneiro and Arbache (2002) using different 
methodologies confirmed that while export growth contributed only marginally to 
economic growth, domestic absorption was the main factor leading both recessive and 
expanding periods.
It could be said, however, that on the one hand, higher trade enabled the economy to 
import more capital goods and technology, changing the production function upwards. 
And that, on the other hand, higher competition disciplined price formation and lead 
firms to produce at a better quality and a lower price. One of the consequences of the 
higher level of technology was the increasing demand for skilled workers at the expense 
of the less skilled. The search for a higher efficiency and quality level may have 
contributed to lead firms to rationalize and modernize production, which also tend to shift 
demand in favour of more skilled workers. In this way, we have also observed increases 
in informality and average unemployment levels, with most of the unemployed and 
informal workers represented by the less skilled and less educated.
Furthermore, increasing exposure to foreign trade has not promoted neither larger 
improvements nor deterioration in inequality indicators. Carneiro and Arbache (2002) 
carried out counterfactual simulations to assess the impact of greater openness on poverty 
and inequality. Despite the fact that greater openness appeared as a scenario associated 
with lower poverty and inequality, the absolute magnitude of the improvement in these 
indicators was very modest. In their simulations, a situation in which import tariff rates 
were lowered to zero, as in the case of a broader WTO agreement, would be associated 
with a drop in the poverty ratio from 33.41% to 32.95% while inequality would remain 
virtually unchanged.
Therefore, the authors conclude that trade liberalization alone will not be sufficient to 
reduce poverty and inequality in Brazil. The situation of extreme inequality in 
educational terms, that in a sense is responsible for an important segmentation in 
Brazilian labour markets, appears to be the issue to be tackled. Policy reforms aimed at 
improving poverty and inequality indicators should, therefore, aim at the reduction of the 
disparity in the skill composition of the labour force so that the positive impacts of 
greater efficiency and the benefits of greater economic integration that might be
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generated with further trade liberalization can be appropriated in a more equitable form 
by Brazilian workers.
13. Conclusions
The main message of this report is that Brazilian labour markets are rather flexible in 
macroeconomic terms while also displaying microeconomic rigidity. Macroeconomic 
flexibility is characterized by the significant growth in employment in both good and bad 
times. Microeconomic rigidity is translated into high turnover rates, frequent litigation, 
and rising informality. This dichotomous relationship is mediated by the third side of the 
labour market that can be best represented by labour market institutions. These have 
contributed to the current state of affairs by means of a rather stringent labour code, rent- 
seeking labour unions, a system of labour courts that encourages litigation, mistargeted 
social security benefits that send wrong signals to workers and employers, feeding 
informality and weak labour relations. The joint effect of this state of affairs is conducive 
to economic inefficiency, income inequality and stable poverty levels, as the economy 
becomes unable to absorb in an equitable way those entering in the labour market and 
barriers to overcome the poverty line become more and more strong.
As a consequence, labour market indicators have deteriorated over the 1990s, hurting the 
young, female and least educated workers. Over the 1990s, for example, female 
unemployment was 30% higher than m ale’s. Gender and race discrimination is still an 
important issue in the country, although several studies point to a significant increase in 
the returns to education of female workers over the last 15 years or so. At the same time, 
informal employment has displayed a structural growth embracing currently 50 percent of 
the workforce. There is also evidence that a significant share of this contingent of 
informal workers is in the informal sector voluntarily not only to escape the grasp of 
labour legislation but also due to low formal sector wages. Slave work has not been 
covered in this report, as there are no published references available in the main academic 
sources and think-tanks specialised on the study of labour issues.
Finally, globalisation has hurt more the unskilled share of the labour force and had a 
limited capacity to improve poverty and inequality indicators. Liberalising measures 
adopted in the early 1990s increased both imports and exports feeding the demand for 
skilled labour at the expense of the unskilled. The result of this phenomenon was a net 
loss of jobs in the labour market. Poverty rates and inequality indices, therefore, continue 
to be the one of the highest in the world. Although there are no reported evidence on the 
existence or not of social dumping in Brazilian exports, indirect results obtained by 
Arbache and De Negri (2002) suggest that this is not a problem in Brazil. These authors 
show that the main Brazilian export firms use highly skilled labour, due to the capital 
intensive technology bias they have historically adopted, making it difficult to believe 
that social dumping in Brazil is an issue defacto.
In terms of labour market flexibility, the picture in Brazil, as portrayed in this report, 
hints to the need of a substantial labour reform. A reform that should focus on changing 
signals and incentives to workers and firms so that more lasting and quality labour
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relations can arise, with implications such as lower job turnover rates, less litigation, 
higher labour productivity, and less informality, with consequent positive effects in terms 
of poverty and income inequality reduction. Although not an easy task, if accomplished, 
this reform should align incentives and price labour correctly, paving the way for a 
healthy and effective labour market flexibility. Perhaps then the expected positive 
impacts of greater efficiency and economic integration might be transmitted to the 
workforce in a more equitable fashion in Brazil.
References
Amadeo,E.J. and J.M. Camargo (1993) Labour Legislation and Institutional Aspects of 
the Brazlilian Labour Code, LABOUR, 7, 157-180.
Arabsheibani, R., F.G. Carneiro, and A. Henley (2002), Gender Wage Differentials in 
Brazil: Trends over a Turbulent Era, University of Wales at Aberystwyth, Discussion 
Paper N. 19/2002, United Kingdom.
Arbache, J.S. and J. De Negri (2002), Determinantes das Exportações Brasileiras: Novas 
Evidências, University of Brasilia, Department of Economics, mimeo.
Barros, R.P., C.H. Corseuil and M. Bahia (1999), Labour M arket Regulations and the 
Duration of Employment in Brazil. Texto para Discussão, No. 676. IPEA, Rio de Janeiro.
Barros, R.P., C.H. Corseuil and M. Foguel (2001), Incentivos Adversos e a Focalizacao 
dos Programas de Protecao ao Trabalhador no Brazil, Texto para Discussão No. 784., 
IPEA, Rio de Janeiro.
Birdsall, J. and Fox, L. M. (1985) W hy males earn more: location and training of 
Brazilian school teachers, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 33 (3) 55-72.
Birdsall, N. and Behrman, J. R. (1991) Why do males earn more than females in urban 
Brazil: Earnings discrimination or job discrimination?, in Unfair Advantage: Labour 
Market Discrimination in Developing Countries, (ed.) Birdsall, N. and Sabot, R. 
(Washington: World Bank), 147-70.
Blinder, A. (1973) Wage discrimination: reduced form and structural estimates, Journal 
o f Human Resources, 8, 436-455.
Cacciamali, M.C. and Fernandes, R. (1993), "Distribuição dos trabalhadores e 
diferenciais de salários entre os mercados de trabalho regulamentado e não- 
regulamentado", Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, 23(1): 135-56.
Calmfors, L. and J. Driffill (1988) Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and 
Macroeconomic Performance, Economic Policy, 6, 13-61.
Camargo, J.M. (2002), Fake Contracts: Justice and Labour Contracts in Brazil, in: 
Carneiro, F.G., I. Gill, R.P. Barros, and A. Blom -  org. (2002), Making Brazil’s Labour 
Market Work for Everyone, The W orld Bank -  IPEA, mimeo.
34
Camargo, J.M. and Serrano, F. (1983) Os dois mercados: homens e mulheres na indústria 
brasileira, Revista Brasileira de Economia, 34.
Cardoso, L.C., Façanha, L.O. and Marinho, A. (2002) Avaliação de Programas Sociais 
(PNAE, PLANFOR, PROGER): Eficiência Relativa e Esquemas de Incentivo, Texto para 
Discussão, No. 859. IPEA, Rio de Janeiro.
Carneiro, F.G. (1997), “The changing informal labour market in Brazil: cyclicality versus 
excessive intervention”, Labour, 11(1): 3-22.
Carneiro, F.G. (1999) Insider Power in Wage Determination: Evidence from Brazilian 
Data, Review of Development Economics, 3, 155-169.
Carneiro, F.G. and J.S. Arbache (2002), The Impacts of Trade Openness on Employment, 
Poverty and Inequality: The Case of Brazil, Report Prepared for the Export-Led Research 
Project, United Nations, New York, mimeo.
Carneiro, F.G. and A. Henley (2002), Earnings and Choice of Formal versus Informal 
Employment in a Developing Economy Labour Market: Evidence for Brazil, University 
of Wales at Aberystwyth, Discussion Paper N. 17/2002, United Kingdom.
Carneiro, F.G., I. Gill, R.P. Barros, and A. Blom -  org. (2002), Making Brazil’s Labour 
Market Work for Everyone, The W orld Bank -  P E A , mimeo.
Cohen, B. and House, W.J. (1996), “Labour market choices, earnings and informal 
networks in Khartoum, Sudan”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 44(3): 
589-618.
Cunningham, Wendy (2000), Unemployment Insurance in Brazil: Unemployment 
Duration, Wages and Sectoral Choice, World Bank.
Dickens, W.T. and Lang, K. (1985), "A test of dual labour market theory", American 
Economic Review, 75(4): 1-22.
Domeland, D. and N. Fiess (2002), Unemployment and Unemployment Insurance, The 
W orld Bank, mimeo.
Fernandes, R. (1996), "Mercado de trabalho não-regulamentado: Participação relativa e 
diferenciais de salários", Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, 26(3):417-41.
Fiess N., M. Fugazza and W. Maloney, (2002), "Exchange Rate Appreciations, Labour 
Market Rigidities, and Informality", W orld Bank forthcoming WP.
Funkhouser, E. (1996), "The urban informal sector in Central America: Household survey 
evidence", World Development, 24(11):1737-51.
Heckman, J. (1997) Diversity and Uniformity: Labour M arket Reform in Argentina, 
University of Chicago Discussion Paper.
35
Johansen, Soren, (1988), "Statistical Analysis of Cointegrating Vectors", Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 12:231-54 June-September 1988.
Kassouf, A.L. (1997) Retornos à Escolaridade e ao Treinamento nos Setores Urbano e 
Rural, Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural, 35, 59-76.
Kassouf, A.L. (2002), Trabalho Infantil, in Lisboa, M.B. and N.A. Menezes (ed.) 
Microeconomia e Sociedade no Brasil, Ed. FGV, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Leme, M.C.S. and Wajnman, S. (2000) Tendências de Coorte nos Diferenciais de 
Rendimento por Sexo, in Henriques, R. (ed.) Desigualdade e Pobreza no Brasil, IPEA, 
Rio de Janeiro.
Loureiro, P.R.A. and Carneiro, F.G. (2001) Discriminação no Mercado de Trabalho: Uma 
Análise dos Setores Rural e Urbano no Brasil, Brazilian Journal o f  Applied Economics, 
5,519-545.
Maloney, W.F. (1999), “Does informality imply segmentation in urban labour markets? 
Evidence from sectoral transitions in M exico”, World Bank Economic Review, 13(2): 
275-302.
Marcoullier, D., Ruiz de Casilla, V. and Woodruff, C. (1997), "Formal measures of the 
informal-sector wage gap in Mexico, El Salvador, and Peru”, Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, 45(2): 367-92.
Oaxaca, R. (1973) Male-female wage differentials in urban labour markets, International 
Economic Review, 14, 693-709.
Oaxaca, R.L. and Ransom, M.R. (1994), “On discrimination and the decomposition of 
wage differentials” , Journal o f  Econometrics, 61:5-21.
Pero, V.L. (1992), "A carteira de trabalho no mercado de trabalho metropolitano 
brasileiro", Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, 22(2):305-402.
Portes, A. and Schaunffler, R. (1993), "Competing perspectives on the Latin American 
informal sector", Population and Development Review, 19(l):33-60.
Pradhan, M. and van Soest, A. (1997), “Household labour supply in urban areas of 
Bolivia”, Review o f  Economics and Statistics, 79(2): 300-310.
Rees, H. and Shah, A. (1986), “An empirical analysis of self-employment in the UK”, 
Journal o f Applied Econometrics, 1:95-108.
Saavedra, J. and Chong, A. (1999), "Structural reform, institutions and earnings: 
Evidence from the formal and informal sectors in urban Peru", Journal o f  Development 
Studies, 35(4):95-116.
36
Sedlacek, G.L., Barros, R.P. and Varandas, S. (1990), "Segmentação e mobilidade no 
mercado de trabalho: A carteira de trabalho em São Paulo", Pesquisa e Planejamento 
Econômico, 20(1):87-103.
Stelcner, M., Smith, J. B., Breslaw, J. A. and Monette, G. (1992) Labour force behavior 
and earnings of Brazilian women and men, 1980, in Case Studies on W omen’s 
Employment and Pay in Latin America  (ed.) Psacharopoulos, G. and Tzannatos, Z. 
(Washington: World Bank), 39-88.
Tannuri-Pianto, M.E. and D.M. Pianto (2002), Informal Employment in Brazil -  A 
Choice at the Top and Segmentation at the Bottom: A Quantile Regression Approach, 
Proceedings of the XXIV Brazilian Econometrics Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Tiefenthaler, J. (1992) Female labour force participation and wage determination in 
Brazil, 1989, in Case Studies on W om en’s Employment and Pay in Latin America (ed.) 
Psacharopoulos, G. and Tzannatos, Z. (Washington: World Bank), 89-118.
Tokman, V. (1992), "The informal sector in Latin America: From underground to 
legality", in Tokman, V. (ed.), Beyond regulation: The informal economy in Latin 
America, International Labour Office, Lynne Reinner, pp. 3-22.
World Bank (2000) Argentina: Labour Market in the New M illennium, Report No.: 
19996-AR.
W orld Bank (2000)Attacking Brazil’s Poverty: A Framework for Sustainable Poverty 
Reduction -  With a Focus on Urban Areas, Report No.: 20475-BR.
37

Matrix of Issues, Interests, and Groups Involved with Labour Market Analysis in Brazil
Issues Interests Institutions Key People
Labour Supply
Child Labour Determinants of child labour, characteristics of child workers, and 
forms to avoid this type of work
ILO, IPEA, Unicef, Unifem, USP Armand Pereira - ILO Representative, Ana 
Lúcia Kassouf (USP)
Domestic Work Profile of domestic workers, forms of contract, conditions of work 
and social protection
ILO, IPEA Hildete Pereira de Melo (IPEA)
Human Capital Impact of human capital variables on earnings and productivity IPEA, USP, PUC-RJ, UCB, UnB Ricardo Paes de Barros (Director of Socia 
Policies - IPEA), Naércio Menezes de 
Aquino (USP), Gustavo Gonzaga (PUC-RJ), 
Francisco Galrão Carneiro (UCB), Adolfo 
Sachsida (UCB), Jorge Saba Arbache (UnB)
Discrimination Determinants of discrimination, importance of gender and race 
disabled work
IPEA, USP, UCB, UnB, UFRGS Ricardo Paes de Barros (Director of Social 
Policies - IPEA), Naércio Menezes de 
Aquino (USP), Maria Carolina Leme (USP), 
Paulo Roberto Loureiro (UCB), Francisco 
Galrão Carneiro (UCB), Adolfo Sachsida 
(UCB), Jorge Saba Arbache (UnB), Eduardo 
Pontual Ribeiro (UFRGS)
Labour Demand
Globalisation 1mpacts of trade liberalization on employment and earnings IPEA, ONU, ILO, IBRD, IDB, UCB, 
UnB, USP
Ricardo Paes de Barros (Director of Social 
Policies - IPEA), Francisco Galrão Carneiro 
(UCB), Jorge Saba Arbache (UnB), Enrique 
Ganuza (ONU), Andreas Blom (IBRD), 
Eduardo Haddad (USP)
nemployment Determinants and duration of unemployment, profile of the 
jnemployed (gender, race, social condition)
IPEA, UNICAMP, IBRD, UCB, UnB, 
DIEESE, PUC-RJ, UFRGS, USP, 
FIESP, CNI
Ricardo Paes de Barros (Director of Social 
Policies - IPEA), Francisco Galrão Carneiro 
(UCB), Jorge Saba Arbache (UnB), Andreas 
Blom (IBRD), Dorte Domeland (IBRD), 
Marcio Pochman (UNICAMP), Marcelo 
Portugal (UFRGS), Naércio Menezes de 




Trade Unions The impacts of trade unions on earnings inequality 
scope of union activities; profile of unionized workers 
labour legislation regarding union activities.
UnB; USP; UCB; IBRD, DIEESE Jorge Saba Arbache (UnB); Naércio 
Menezes de Aquino (USP); Francisco 
Galrão Carneiro (UCB); Paulo Roberto 
Loureiro (UCB); Amit Dar (IBRD)
Minimum Wages The impact of minimum wages on employment, 
wages, and the public deficit; minimum wages and 
poverty.
UCB, IPEA, IBRD, USP, DIEESE Francisco Galrão Carneiro (UCB), 
Ricardo Paes de Barros (IPEA), Carlos 
Henrique Corseuil (IPEA), Sergei 
Soares (IPEA), Luciana Servo (IPEA), 




Freedom of association, structure of collective 
bargaining and economic performance, labour 
legislation and the right to organize
ILO, UNICAMP, IBRD, UCB, 
DIEESE
Francisco Galrão Carneiro (UCB), 
Armand Pereira (ILO), Márcio Pochman 
(UNICAMP), Amit Dar (IBRD), Zafiris 
Tzannatos (IBRD)
Wage Determination Main determinants of wages, wage bargaining 
models, the trade-off between wages and 
unemployment, minimum wage policies
UCB, IPEA, USP, UnB, UFRGS, 
DIEESE
Francisco Galrão Carneiro (UCB), 
Miguel Nathan Foguel (IPEA), Reynaldo 
Gonçalves, Carlos Alberto Ramos 
(UnB), Marcelo Portugal (UFRGS), 
Gustavo Gonzaga (PUC-RJ)
Social Safety Net The structure and effectiveness of social protection 
instruments, such as severance funds, unemployment 
nsurance, and consumption smoothing benefits; the 
targeting of these benefits; their impact on labour 
market performance and unemployment duration
IPEA, UCB, UnB, USP, IBRD, 
DIEESE
Francisco Galrão Carneiro (UCB), 
Ricardo Paes de Barros (IPEA), 
Reynaldo Gonçalves (USP), Carlos 
Alberto Ramos (UnB), Dorte Domeland 
(IBRD)
Labour Legislation The impact of externalities of labour laws over 
employment and rights in both rural and urban 
sectors; the functioning of labour courts
UCB, PUC-RJ, USP, IBRD, 
DIEESE, CNI, FIESP
Francisco Galrão Carneiro (UCB), José 
Márcio Camargo (PUC-RJ), José 
Pastore (USP), José Luiz Guasch 
(IBRD)
40
Informal Sector The importance of the informal labour market, 
determinants and incentives to informality; profile of 
informal workers; choice of participation in the informa 
sector
UCB, PUC-RJ, USP, IBRD, 
PIMES, UNICAMP, UnB, DIEESE
Francisco Galrão Carneiro (UCB), José 
Márcio Camargo (PUC-RJ), Maria 
Cristina Cacciamali (USP), William 
Maloney (IBRD), Jorge Jatobá (PIMES), 
Mareio Pochman (UNICAMP), Maria 
Eduarda Tanuri-Pianto (UnB)
Poverty and Inequality
Urban Poverty Profile of urban poor; determinants and incidence of 
urban poverty; poverty reduction strategies
IPEA, FGV-RJ, PUC-RJ, IBRD, 
UNICAMP, USP, UCB
Ricardo Paes de Barros (IPEA), Sônia 
Rocha (IPEA), Ana Peliano (IPEA), 
Sergei Soares (IPEA), Marcelo Neri 
(FGV-RJ), José Márcio Camargo (PUC- 
RJ), Peter Lanjouw (IBRD), Francisco 
Ferreira (IBRD), Reynaldo Gonçalves 
(USP), Francisco Galrão Carneiro 
(UCB)
Rural Poverty Profile of rural poor; social security for the rural poor; 
migration and poverty in rural areas; poverty reduction 
strategies
IPEA, UNICAMP, IBRD, UCB Guilherme Delgado (IPEA), José 
Graziano (Director of Project RURBANO 
- UNICAMP), Peter Lanjouw (IBRD), 
Francisco Galrão Carneiro (UCB)
Income Inequality Determinants of income inequality; strategies to 
reduce inequality; measuring income inequality; 
inequality and poverty
IPEA, ESALQ, IBRD Ricardo Paes de Barros (IPEA), Sergei 
Soares (IPEA), Rodolfo Hoffman 
(ESALQ), Francisco Ferreira (IBRD)
Earnings Inequality Determinants of inter-industry wage differentials; 
union wage premium; earnings inequality and 
discrimination
UnB, UCB, IPEA, USP Jorge Saba Arbache (UnB), Francisco 
Galrão Carneiro (UCB), Paulo Roberto 
Loureiro (UCB), Carlos Henrique 
torseuil (IPEA), João de Negri (IPEA), 
Naércio Menezes de Aquino (USP)
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